When you see police patrolling the alleys and destroying the vehicles that are parked there, it’s a clear sign that the regime has weakened big time.
Now that the street protests have largely been quieted the rough way, and anyway the foreign media cannot report them, a question looms: how will life go on in Iran?
The only answer I can see is that things will get worse. The regime, weakened by the protests and the challenges posed by their own establishment (let us not forget that people like Mousavi and Rafsanjani are a byproduct of the regime just like Khamanei and Ahmadinejad), will have to resort to repression in order to keep people quiet.
This may not be enough, though. While people are still scared, and resort to tricks such as changing their identity in Facebook in order to protect themselves from retaliation, the protests that are still going on these days are not anymore linked to Mousavi, or the Green movement. Rather, they are led by university students and middle-class youngsters, who took the pretext of the recent protests in order to demonstrate against the regime in general.
This is a risky gamble for the Islamic Republic. Let us not forget that the restrictions imposed by the regime(from the compulsory headscarf for women to the absence of any form of entertainment) are at least as important a factor as the economic mismanagement behind the discontent of the young, educated Iranians.
And when you lose your brains, you have lost your country.
Update (1 July): I have just found out that no less than Martin Fletcher from no less than The Times actually agrees with me!
It was to be expected. After the fruitless attempts of the Iranian leadership to identify a crack in the all-too-careful statements of Barack Obama, the search for an outside enemy that could distract people from Iran’s internal mess has yielded its result. We’re proud to announce that Satan version II (not as evil as Bush’s America but meaner and shrewder) is officially announced to be the U.K.
The arrest of nine British embassy employees is definitely a well targeted provocation, and one that is not likely to leave mr. Milliband (her Majesty’s foreign secretary) indifferent. Even though five of them have subsequently been released, it’s clear that the dispute will not end so easily.
It is interesting to note that the diplomatic row between the U.K. and Iran is not fresh: it had started already a week or so ago, with the expulsion of the BBC correspondant in Tehran John Leyne, and had already escalated to the next level when Iran expelled two British diplomats, a move which was promptly retaliated by the U.K. authorities.
Where will this end? the eventual target is obviously the new US president Obama, but he is extremely (and rightly) careful to not get involved. While the events unfold, rumours from Iran have it that Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the real mastermind behind the protests, is in the holy city of Qom, trying to convert as many clerics as possible to his cause. How fast he can succeed in this is key to the events: if no major international crisis erupts in the meantime, it could even be possible that Khamenei’s head may end up rolling. This is the major battle that is being played, and the international events will only be the frame for it.
The key question is: will the US manage to convince Britain to keep their head down long enough?
PS: amidst all this mess stands out the fantastic performance of Sweden’s security forces, who allowed protesters to break into the Iranian embassy in Stockholm, and prompting the inevitable request for explanation by the Iranian authorities, all too happy to have scored a point against the “terrorists” that are protesting. Well done mr. Bildt!
There are several theories about what is going on in Iran right now.
We’ve seen it all: mass rallies in support of the defeated presidential candidates Mirhossein Moussavi, clashes between supporters of different candidates, crackdown by the authorities (quite mild, actually, in comparison to what it could have been), and most recently, no less than Ali Khamanei, the supreme leader, warning protesters of the outcome of any possible further mass demonstrations.
Some people have evoked the Islamic Revolution, saying we’re going to see another regime overthrow. But this is not likely to happen: the protesters are demanding a repeat of the elections, and have never questioned the system itself. Moussavi himself is a byproduct of the Revolution itself, and has been very careful in abiding to the constitution.
After all, Iran is as close to a democracy as we have here in the Middle East. Even though the vetoing power over presidential and parliament candidates makes the democracy incomplete, pretty much every other mechanism is comparable to Western democracies such as Europe and the US.
No, the youngsters that are on the streets today are not going to change the regime once more. They simply want that their vote is counted. They are on the street because they believe in the system, not because they want to change it. They want the system to function!
And why is all this allowed to happen in a country where opposition is usually kept behind closed doors? this has to do with an internal power struggle that dates back long time. The people are allowed to be on the street and voice their opinion because a large part of the establishment supports Moussavi and, chiefly, is against Ahmadinejad and his suicidal populist policies.
The head of the Assembly of Experts Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, parliament speaker and former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, former president Mahmoud Khatami are only a few of the prominent names that are openly supporting Moussavi. These people are united under this anti-Ahmadinejad cause by mostly economic reasons: they believe that the isolationist and populist policies that he has implemented have done no good to Iran (and mostly to their personal interests), and want to support a candidate that favours a less extremist policy towards the West and market economy.
However, the same can be said of these highly influential people as is true for the students on the street: they want the system to stay, and know that delegitimating it with a rogue vote will only jeopardize their positions and the country overall.
What will happen next? it’s hard to say. The establishment is clearly afraid of this unprecedented wave of protests, and the incidents that we have all witnessed on the street and inside universities have been a proof of the tension that is in the air.
However, they have not made their mind up yet (at least not until yesterday’s statement by Khamenei), and the partial opening to vote recount that has been expressed by the Council of Guardians indicates that not everyone agrees on what to do.
One likely outcome of this political stall is that by performing a vote recount the election will be declared invalid, and people will be called to vote again. However, this would mean that the head of Ahmadinejad will roll (a necessary sacrifice to keep the Islamic Republic alive).
The other scenario is that the government will take a firm stance and protests will be silenced by conceding something to their leaders. However, it is hard to say what will be considered as a sufficient compensation, considering that they allowed events to deteriorate this much.
One thing is almost certain: we will see more of the bloodshed that the streets of Tehran have witnessed lately if protests continue. It seems to be a necessary price to pay at this point.
It seems that my predictions in yesterday’s post were wrong: it wasn’t a close race, and it wasn’t Mousavi who won. At least, if you look at the official numbers.
But there’s something bigger going on in Iran right now. Among widespread accusations of cheating, the people have taken to the street, and they are making their voice heard. It’s extremely hard to follow the events from a distance, but more and more worrying news are starting to flock in (Mousavi under house arrest, Rafsanjani resigning from his powerful political post, some people dead in clashes between supporters of Mousavi and police).
The videos that have appeared in large numbers on the web are a proof that the authorities are afraid of what’s going on. There’s simply too much power at stake with too many influential people having gone one step too far.
Is this really the start of a new revolution? or will Tehran (and the rest of the country with it) go back to its life behind closed doors?
I place my bet on Mirhossein Mousavi. He’ll win by a low margin on Ahmadinejad, and there will be cross-accusations of cheating. At the end, the conservatives will keep ruling the country, but there’ll be a swift change in economic policies and an increase of freedom for the man (and mostly the woman) on the street.
The atmosphere in Iran is similar to the one that was seen before the 1997 elections that brought Khatami to power, and not far from recounts of the pre-Revolutionary days. This is a good sign that the Iranian democracy, though incomplete and flawed, is still something that young Iranians believe in. I admire the energy that they have put into this electoral campaign.
BBC aired the review of a very interesting documentary on troubled Tehranian teens, showing the multitude of issues that the next president of Iran must (or has an option to) face.
Drug and alcohol abuse are hushed by the Islamic Republic authorities, but it’s high time that someone brought the issue up to the table and resolved it. Or we’ll see hundreds more of these cases.
Chiaramente, il governo iraniano ha paura di Facebook. Il motivo principale sembra essere lo stesso che causa i blocchi di internet e la censura dei giornali stranieri: l’informazione, secondo Ahmadinejad e compagnia, va controllata minuziosamente, in un modello che ricorda molto il comunismo.
E di recente, con le elezioni alle porte, le altalene sull’accesso a Facebook danno una buona idea di quanto la linea da tenere non sia chiara neppure all’interno del governo conservatore. Facebook non era accessibile in Iran fino a pochi mesi fa, quando il governo di Ahmadinejad ha rilassato la censura, in quello che molti interpretano come un tentativo di riavvicinarsi al popolo di internet.
Tuttavia, concedere libero accesso avrebbe significato rischiare che gli iraniani (specie i giovani, che costituiscono il 70% della popolazione) si informassero troppo bene sulle elezioni, senza ascoltare la verita’ che viene dall’alto dell’ufficio presidenziale. Ed ecco, puntuale, il decreto che sancisce il blocco a Facebook, datato 22 maggio.
Ma il blocco ha effetti collaterali pericolosi, in quanto rinforza l’odio del popolo di internet verso il governo, e sposta i loro voti ancora di piu’ dalla parte del candidato dell’opposizione, Mirhossein Mousavi. Ecco quindi la marcia indietro, datata 26 maggio.
Non proprio una bella figura. Ma non molti sanno che il presidente in persona, un giorno prima che il blocco venisse revocato, aveva giurato al popolo iraniano di non aver autorizzato il decreto di blocco. Questo dimostra quanto all’amministrazione stia a cuore l’argomento.
Elections In Iran are not far ahead, and, as usual, diplomacy is at work big time inside and outside Iran. Clearly, the name of the next presidents interests not only the Iranians, but also many other people outside the country.
Let’s start with Egypt: on April 21 they have summoned the top Iranian diplomat in Cairo (the two countries are still at cold war, and have no official diplomatic ties). This surely has to do with Hizbollah and Lebanese elections, as the linked article suggests, but are we really sure that Egypt (largest Arab country) has no interest in the outcome of the elections in Iran (the largest country in the Middle East?).
We continue with Czech (the country that holds the EU presidency until June 30). The Czech envoy in Tehran has been summoned by Iranian officials over alleged lack of action in Gaza during the war. Could this be a sign that Iran wants to make its voice heard in Europe, or simple retaliation against Egypt, an active sponsor of the Israeli invasion in Gaza?
In any case, the Iran-Czech crisis quickly turned into friendship again, sponsored by no less than the Ministry of Commerce.
The case of Roxana Saberi, amply debated in the media over the last few weeks, has been another demonstration that the Iranian diplomacy is fully at work in these days before elections. It seems that the Iranian government is anxious to prove to the world (and to the Iranian voters) that Iran still counts big time in the international political scene. Roxana’s recounts of her time in prison are quite chilling, but we must not forget that her case was quite typical in the way it was handled, as if to say to the US administration: we listen to you, but we fear you not
And of course there’s been the case with Italy. Everyone knows the story: Franco Frattini, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had arranged a quick visit to Iran in mid May, only to cancel it in the last minute when Iran communicated that the meeting with Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki had to happen in the same city (Semnan) where the latest missile launch happened.
It seems that the Iranians have realised how big a mistake this was. Italy is well known in terms of foreign policy: a friend of the US, but also an independent country, and one that has a reputation of cordial relationship with almost any other country. Frattini publicly announced that the cancellation was due to the link to the missile tests (here is an excerpt of his press release in Italian). However, Iran was quick to deny that, which must be interpreted as a clear admission of a mistake.
How does this sum up? in my opinion, the Iranian government is trying to emphasize the importance of foreign policy in the days that precede elections. But this is not going to give Mahmoud Ahmadinejad too many favours. While he may win the favours of the proudest Iranians and the bazaris, it’s in his base (lower-middle class Iranians) that he must go hunting for votes. And with the dismal handling of a favourable economic situation, and more and more people living in poverty, he will not have an easy ride back to presidency.
